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Abstract 
The aim of this article is two-fold. Firstly, it is to advance the case for Activity Theory (AT) 
as a credible and alternative lens to view and research sports coaching. Secondly, it is to 
position this assertion within the wider debate about the epistemology of coaching. Following 
a framing introduction, a more comprehensive review of the development and current 
conceptualisation of AT is given. Here, AT’s evolution through three distinct phases and 
related theorists, namely Vygotsky, Leont’ev and Engeström, is initially traced. This gives 
way to a more detailed explanation of AT’s principal conceptual components, including 
‘object’, ‘subject’, ‘tools’ (mediating artefacts), ‘rules’, a ‘community’ and a ‘division of 
labour’. An example is then presented from empirical work illustrating how AT can be used 
as a means to research sports coaching. The penultimate section locates such thinking within 
coaching’s current ‘epistemological debate; arguing that the coaching ‘self’ is not an 
autonomous individual, but a relative part of social and cultural arrangements. Finally, a 
conclusion summarises the main points made, particularly in terms in presenting the 
grounding constructivist epistemology of AT as a potential way forward for sports coaching. 
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Introduction 
In recent times, Activity Theory (AT) has become an increasingly popular lens through which 
to research work-place settings (Hardman, 2008). In this respect, it has been used to examine 
areas such human-computer interaction and ergonomics (Kuutti, 1996), cognitive psychology 
(Bedny & Meister, 1997), as well as pedagogy (Hardman, 2008). Derived from the work of 
the Soviet educational psychologists Vygotsky (1978) and Leont’ev (1978), AT is a concept 
drawn from the idea that all social action is mediated, mainly by language, discourse and 
other cultural means. With its focus on situating action in context, AT subsequently contends 
that one cannot study or understand individuals’ actions outside the environment in which 
they take place.  
 This latter point makes AT particularly relevant to pedagogy. This is because it 
focuses on practice which, in turn, is taken as being mediated by cultural ‘tools’ (i.e., aspects 
of culture) created and transformed during the practice itself (Nardi, 1995). More specifically, 
the object of AT is to understand the unity of consciousness and activity (Kuutti, 1996), with 
context being considered to be created by and to act upon individuals, rather than simply the 
canvas upon which that activity is painted. Context then, is taken as generated through 
activity, allowing actors to reframe their behaviours as they engage with that activity 
(Leont’ev, 1978).  
Within such a conceptualisation, pedagogy is viewed as a complex social system, 
whose trajectory or course is inherently influenced by socio-cultural factors (Hardman, 
2008). The same could be said of coaching, which has, over the past decade, been 
increasingly recognised as a social, non-linear process, replete with issues of contextual 
contestation and negotiation (Jones & Wallace, 2005, 2006). In doing so, portrayals of 
unproblematic chronology and ‘modelling’ have been de-emphasised, as has been the 
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assumption that an identified linkage in one context could ever be directly repeated in another 
(Puddifoot 2000). 
Despite such recognition, with a few exceptions (e.g., Cushion & Jones, 2006; Purdy, 
Jones & Cassidy, 2009), research in coaching continues to be somewhat starved of contextual 
considerations, the associated complex-aware rhetoric being somewhat hollow in terms of 
appreciating how coaching actually plays out as situated action (Jones, Bowes & Kingston, 
2010). In this respect, the study of coaching has tended to ignore the social beyond the 
interactional. This neglect is unwarranted, particularly in light of the consistent and 
considerable body of evidence indicating that coaches’ considerations regarding athlete 
development surround contextually bound social sensitivities (from Saury & Durand, 1998;  
Jones, Armour & Potrac, 2004; Jones, Potrac, Cushion & Ronglan, 2011 among others). 
The principal purpose of this article is two-fold. Firstly, it is to present the case for 
Activity Theory (Leont’ev, 1978) as a credible perspective to explore and deconstruct sports 
coaching. Here, in developing an existing line of reasoning (Jones et al., 2010), an example 
from empirical work is presented illustrative of the possibilities of AT in this regard. 
Secondly, the aim stretches to developing this argument into a wider debate about the 
grounding epistemology of coaching (Abraham & Collins, 2011; Grecic & Collins, 2013; 
North, 2013; Jones, 2012).  
The significance of the article lies in building on previous work where the worth of 
pedagogical theories to sports coaching has been outlined (Jones, 2006; Kirk, 2010 among 
others). Here, the case was made that coaches should be considered as educators, and 
coaching as a complex pedagogical process. The purpose then relates to furthering a 
relatively fresh, new way to look at coaching, thus building on the current framework of 
analysis. It is based on the premise that coaching is fundamentally intertwined with coach 
teaching and athlete learning within given situational constraints; that is, at the heart of 
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coaching lies the teaching-learning interface complete with its inherent non-routine, 
problematic and complex characteristics (Jones, 2006). The argument made takes issue with 
the continuing claims of the sequential ‘models’ approach to coaching which (despite 
considerable evidence to the contrary) persists in advocating coaching as logical chains of 
propositions that can be elaborated into given systems of knowledge (e.g., Abraham & 
Collins, 2011). Rather, although acknowledgement is given to developmental discourse, 
primacy is afforded within this paper to the dynamic rings of invisible social contexts which 
surround the coach-athlete relationship, and their effects of practice (McLaughlin & Talbert 
1993). 
The importance of the article also stretches to further clarifying the ‘complexity of 
coaching’ debate; a discussion highlighted some years ago in a special edition of the 
International Journal of Sport Science and Coaching (IJSSC). Here, Cushion’s (2007) case 
for the complex nature of coaching was critiqued by Lyle (2007) and others as ‘over egging 
the pudding’. The general admonishment here centred on a (perceived) need for greater 
appreciation of definitive process and structure within coaching. It is a criticism recently 
reiterated by Collins and colleagues (Abraham & Collins, 2011; Grecic & Collins, 2013) and 
North (2013) who, in presenting coaching as a ‘logical decision-making’ process, argued for 
more ‘practical skills’ and ‘useful pointers’ to be outlined from research. Although previous 
work has consistently emphasised the complexity position as not being against the 
conceptualisation of coaching as a process (see Jones & Wallace, 2005, 2006), perhaps the 
case made has not been explicit enough. Consequently, the current paper, in both drawing 
attention to and expanding on existing work (e.g., Jones & Wallace, 2005, 2006; Bowes & 
Jones, 2006; Jones et al., 2010), can be seen as a response to Abraham and Collins’ (2011) 
claim that this step has yet to be taken, and North’s (2013) contention that the view given by 
opponents of the processual modelling perspective has been one of ‘unmanageable 
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complexity’. With this in mind, however, taking that both schools of thought appear to 
respect the need for structure and agency, the discussion should not be encased in an either/or 
scenario but within the confines of degrees (a point debated at greater length in the 
penultimate section). 
Accepting this ‘shades of grey’ position as a point of departure, we nevertheless take 
a lead from Law (2006) who asked the question that if we consider something to be messy (as 
most coaching scholars, rhetorically at least, seem to agree on), then “would something less 
messy make a mess of describing it?” It is a case that simplicity won’t help us understand 
complex things. He even goes so far as to claim that some social scientists’ refusal to 
(sincerely) acknowledge the messy nature of life, “in their attempts to make the world clean 
and neat”, actively repress the very possibility of understanding the reality they purport to 
study. It is not an approach that has served coaching well from the perspective of practice or 
as a profession. In terms of the former, the empirical evidence continues to mount that 
practitioners don’t find such simplicity (or rationality) of much value in supporting or 
informing their work (Chesterfield, Potrac, & Jones, 2010; Nash, Sproule, Hall & English, 
2012; Potrac, Jones, Gilbourne & Nelson, 2013). Similarly, with regard to the latter, such 
functionalist research only makes a negligible contribution at best to the creation of a 
recognisable domain-specific critical tradition.  
The paper’s claim to originality, however, must be tempered as not only (and 
inevitably) does it borrow heavily from the work of Leont’ev for its theoretical grounding, 
but also on the writings of Theureau (1992) and Hardman (2007, 2008) in terms of related 
means of inquiry. The purpose then, as opposed to opening totally ‘new areas of 
investigation’, relates to clarifying and developing earlier work (e.g., Bowes & Jones, 2005, 
2006; Jones et al., 2010) in more firmly rooting complexity-related thought and studies, and  
in particular AT, within coaching research.  
6 
 
In terms of structure, following this introduction, a more comprehensive review of the 
development and current conceptualisation of AT is given. This is followed by an outline of 
how a method using AT as a grounding framework can be used to research sports coaching 
(through an analysis of critical incidents or ‘evaluative episodes’) (Hardman, 2007, 2008). 
Here, an empirical example is given of how such an analysis looks like in practice. The 
penultimate section locates such thinking within coaching’s current ‘epistemological debate; 
that is; how relative and/or absolute should we position the activity. Finally, a conclusion 
summarises the main points made and provides signposts for possible future research and 
discussion. 
AT: Its development and establishment 
Broadly defined, AT is a philosophical and cross-disciplinary framework that can be used to 
study forms of human practice where both individual and social processes are interlinked 
(Kuutti, 1996). Its roots are firmly embedded within Marxist philosophy and Soviet 
educational psychology, from which it explored the active, developmental and constructive 
roles of human actions (Kutti, 1995). Originally referred to as Cultural-Historical Activity 
Theory (CHAT), AT is commonly associated with Vygotsky’s (1978) concept of mediated 
action and Leont’ev’s (1978) hierarchical structure of human activity. Founded on a number 
of basic, yet interrelated principles, AT provides an ecological perspective from which to 
understand the unity connecting the human mind [consciousness] and activity [what people 
do] (Nardi, 1996).  
The first conceptualisation of AT, as stated, drew heavily on Vygotsky’s concept of 
mediation whereby individuals’ interact with objects in the world by means of cultural 
artefacts; signs, symbols and practical tools (Hardman, 2008). All social action then, was 
construed as mediated action. The central premise was that humans are not passive 
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participants but operate within a shared social environment where interactions instigate 
meaning making processes enabling them to engage in that shared activity. It was argued that 
the mediation of these cultural and historical tools or considerations influenced the nature of 
external behaviour, and subsequently the mental functioning of individuals in everyday 
practice. 
Critiquing the idea that only focussing on mediation at the individual level limited the 
possibility of analysis, Leont’ev (1978) and other second-generation theorists developed a 
framework to illustrate how cognitive change happens within a collective or mutual context 
(Blin & Munro, 2008). Consequently, from a Leontovian perspective, individual action 
became further viewed as socially mediated, where consciousness and meaning are formed in 
a communal activity (Foot, 2001). As such, Leont’ev proposed human mediated activity to be 
a social system characterised by a division of labour and rules that arbitrate, facilitate and 
construct the interaction within it (Engestrőm, 1987). Here, individual activity was 
considered the result of systems of social artefacts and endeavours, as opposed to the isolated 
or unrelated cognitive functions of a human agent (Nardi, 1996).  
Although the work of Leont’ev developed insight into how personal actions are 
engaged within the social, it was criticised for failing to situate the motives, emotions and 
creativity of an individual within context (Hardman, 2008). As such, a third evolutionary 
stage of AT offered conceptual tools to understand dialogue, multiple perspectives and 
cultural diversity. Here, in moving still further away from the initial person centred 
considerations of AT, Engeström (1987) addressed both the individual and the social through 
the concept of activity systems analysis. The focus lay on interrelated activity systems that 
explore partially shared understandings, as well as issues of subjectivity, emotion, identity, 
and moral commitment (Engeström, 2009). To understand the nature of AT from this 
perspective, Kutti (1996) suggested that we must consider an activity to have both an external 
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and internal nature, whereby the subject and object of an activity are in a reciprocal 
relationship. This, according to Cole (1996), extends the idea of AT to allow for socio-
political factors and situations. It is a perspective which emphasises AT’s social, dynamic 
nature, giving credence to its object-orientated activity, its multi-voicedness, its historicity, 
the role of contradictions, and its possibilities for expansive learning (Engeström, 2009). 
 
Exploring the complexity of coaching: How AT (and course-of-action analysis 
[Theureau, 1992]) can help 
 
Coaching has increasingly been theorised as a complex social system (where the term 
complex is used principally as a noun) (Bowes & Jones, 2005, 2006; Jones et al., 2010; 
LeBed & Bar Eli, 2013). Here, the activity has been positioned as a co-operative, socially 
contested endeavour, containing elements of initiation, reaction and exchange within 
temporal boundaries. Such a conceptualisation draws heavily upon the early work of Marc 
Durand and colleagues (Sève, & Durand 1999; Saury & Durand, 1998; Hauw & Durand, 
2005, 2007) in coaching, Sonsino and Moore (2001) and others (e.g., Jess, Atencio & 
Thorburn, 2011) within pedagogy, as well as complex systems writings more generally.   
In recent work, however, a conscious effort has been made to link complexity theory, 
including the view of coaching as a complex adaptive system, with that of AT more 
definitively (Jones et al., 2010). Here, both situated action (Suchman 1987) and AT 
(Leont’ev, 1978) were discussed as perspectives informing a course-of-action analysis to 
more sensitively engage with coaching’s non-linear, flexible nature (Thelen & Smith, 1996). 
In this regard, credence was given to an individual’s conscious motivation, thus supporting a 
proactive as opposed to a reactive view of action (LeBed & Bar Eli, 2013). Such (coaching) 
behaviours, however, were not considered isolated motivations, but rather influenced by 
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dynamically changing environments. Subsequently, according to LeBed and Bar-Eli (2013), 
the purpose of coaches’ acts can be interpreted as the ‘regulation of equifinality’; that is, 
“intervention utilising soft control that directs the self-organization of a human system from 
the outside” (p.39). Echoing Jones and colleagues’ (Jones & Wallace, 2005, 2006: Jones et 
al., 2011) conceptualisation of coaching as social orchestration, it is a view which positions 
the coach as trying to converge differing means and ways towards an accepted common goal. 
Although, again, acknowledgement of a progressive practice is given, such a stance does not 
locate the coach within the confines of a predictable, self-centred or highly explicative 
process. Rather, he or she is placed as an actor in an open adaptable system; in a web of 
relations between individuals who share a common goal that forms, dissolves and re-forms 
anew as that goal is actually sought. Despite the recognition of coaching as complex, methods 
to engage with this complexity have only limitedly been engaged with. It is to this issue then, 
paying particular attention to course-of action analysis and AT, that we now turn. 
Course-of-action analysis 
Within the recent work of Jones et al. (2010), course-of-action analysis was posited as a 
means to better explore the given complexity of coaching. In borrowing from Sonsino and 
Moore (2001), coaching was conceptualised as taking place “at or near the ‘edge of chaos’; a 
state which lies neither in a zone of complete stability nor total flux” (Jones et al., 2010: 15). 
Studying such a non-linear dynamic process then, which still acknowledged a (target) goal 
and where the distinction between cognition and behaviour was recognised as blurred, 
necessitated an exploration and understanding of situated action. 
 In meeting such conditions, course-of-action (Theureau, 1992) seeks to describe and 
analyse the action of agents in relation to the characteristics of the situation. It is a 
perspective which locates the focus or the unit of analysis as being more than just the 
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individual actor or the environment, to the interaction that occurs between these two over 
time. In this respect, it argues for the importance of participation in structuring thought, as 
opposed to any pre-defined ‘effective’ best practice. Consequently, in considering that 
cognition is inseparable from the activity where it is produced, with no distinction drawn 
between action and interpretation, course-of-action analysis holds the potential to examine 
the seemingly intuitive, unplanned actions of coaches; those which accommodate 
unforeseeable contextual contingencies whilst respecting the boundaries of a plotted course.  
Activity theory (AT) 
As previously stated, central to AT is the understanding that pedagogy (inclusive of learning) 
is a culturally based social endeavour; the mind being considered as situated in context. The 
unit of analysis within AT is the object-orientated, collective and culturally mediated activity. 
The activity, or the activity system, is, in turn, conceived as comprising an ‘object’, ‘subject’, 
‘tools’ (mediating artefacts), ‘rules’, a ‘community’ and a ‘division of labour’. AT then, 
allows us to look at coaching along these dimensions. For instance, the subject of the 
coaching system is the coach. The epistemic assumptions held by each coach will influence 
how he or she sees the role, and impact what tools will be used, when and where. The subject 
is consequently considered to act on the object.  
The object equates to the problem that both coach and athlete(s) are working towards 
(e.g., correcting or developing a tennis player’s backhand stroke), and can be considered as 
the primary focus of the activity system (Hardman, 2007). Activities then, are considered 
both collective and motivated by the need to transform an object into a desired outcome (e.g., 
greater consistency or more velocity on the given backhand) (Blin & Munro, 2007). Indeed, it 
is the object that imbues an activity with meaning, allowing for its ‘structured understanding’ 
(Kaptelenin, 2005). Although fundamental to AT, the object remains an area for debate 
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within it. Here, even though Leont’ev originally tied it to motive, Engeström (1987) defined 
the object as the ‘raw material’ or ‘problem space’ at which the activity is directed. This, in 
turn, is transformed into outcomes with the assistance of a variety of mediating instruments; a 
view which necessitates the “need to focus on the object construction in the context of 
activity” (Hardman, 2007: 55). 
Mediating artefacts can be considered the ‘tools’ used by a coach. These tools mediate 
thought during the interaction between subject and context. Such tools can be physical or 
material (e.g., cones, bibs, an electronic white board) or, perhaps more obviously in relation 
to coaching, to do with language and discourse. Indeed, one of the most prevalent tools used 
can be that of coaches’ talk (including questioning and instruction). 
The rules refer to the norms, interactions and social conventions of the gym or sports 
field, which drive, enable and constrain the subject’s (i.e., the coach’s) actions. Such rules are 
to do with the social conventions that guide coaching, how the coach treats the athletes and 
how athletes treat each other. These could also include a coach’s normative working 
strategies; for example, allowing a degree of latitude and lack of formal structure within 
practices. Rules can thus be divided into those that concern the instructional context, and 
those that involve the social order. The first can include evaluative rules towards the goal at 
hand, while the latter refers to the social rules that govern interaction and organisation 
between coach and athletes. Finally, in this respect, the coach and athletes are members of an 
active community who work towards a shared object. Within the community, there is also a 
given division of labour, with responsibilities, tasks and power being constantly negotiated 
(Cole & Engström, 1993; Hardman, 2008) 
In a recent article, Hardman (2008) demonstrated how an AT approach, using the 
concepts listed above, could be used to analyse pedagogy. More specifically, the analysis 
centred on critical incidents, or what she termed evaluative episodes within the contextual 
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interaction. An evaluative episode or event was defined as a coherent activity where a teacher 
disrupts the “pedagogical script [to] make visible the evaluative criteria required for students 
to produce a legitimate text” (Hardman, 2007: 57). Here, the teacher (or coach) is called upon 
to restate and make clear the evaluative criteria in response to on-going learner progress. 
Hardman’s (2007) discourse related to ‘disruptions’ and ‘restatement’ draw heavily on 
Flanagan’s (1954) definition of critical incidents and Goodwin’s (2001: 7) understanding of 
turning points, where  a teacher or coach’s “utterances shape the tone of the subsequent 
interaction”. Such an evaluation can provide insight into a pedagogue’s epistemic 
assumptions about the nature of his or her work and how they go about it. In this case, it can 
provide a window through which we can view pedagogic behaviour in relation to a generally 
accepted aim (i.e., an object). A principal way through which these episodes can be 
developed is through the checking of learner understanding. For instance, take the following 
example (drawn from on-going PhD work) of a football (soccer) coach trying to generate 
learning among players about the principle of denying the opposition space and thus good 
quality possession1,2.  
Coach: Ok, you've had a look at the field ....it’s a small pitch, with Fred not playing, we’re 
losing a bit of height at the back.......so what I really want you to think about is to push up 
from the back (i.e., moving the defensive line further up the field), squeeze a touch higher (to 
make the area of engagement smaller). A touch higher than we normally do (the coach uses 
his hand in a pushing manner to emphasise the squeeze action). Do you understand?  
Players: [almost in unison] yes, ok! 
Coach: We want to squeeze up the field so we inhibit any service they want to provide to 
their forward players…(Long pause)…is that ok? 
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Player 1: So you’re saying you want us to play a high (defensive) line? 
Coach: Yes...but not without consideration....play in relation to where the ball is... so play 
higher than usual without being rigid about it.....because we outnumber them in midfield, we 
ought to be able to squeeze and hold quite high....(the coach again pushes an imaginary line 
forward with his hand as he speaks)…….What we don't want is for their midfield players to 
have possession, be able to look up and make passes behind our defence because their 
attackers look quite quick. Remember that the point here is to deny the opponents time and 
space when in possession, so we can win the ball back earlier and higher up the field. 
Player 2: So you’re asking Kyle [and the defence] to push the back line and play high up the 
field? Sorry, but I don’t quite understand [a murmur of agreement rises from some of the 
other players] 
Coach: ok, no problem [the coach bends down to place 11 white cones on the dressing room 
floor illustrative of the players’ starting positions]. We’ve agreed that we need to play the 
game more in the opponents’ half of the field, right? 
Players: yes. 
Coach: Why? 
Player 2: So we can be closer to their goal when we win the ball back. 
Coach: (nods) In order to do that, we need to compress the field as a team [the coach then 
draws a line with chalk indicating that almost all the outfield players are positioned in the 
opposition’s half]. So, what will this enable us to do when they have the ball? 
Player 1: We can close the opposing player(s) in possession easier…. 
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Coach: Why can we do this? 
Player 3: Because we have compressed the total area of the playing field. We are basically 
starting closer to them. 
Player 4:…because the distance between us and them is smaller 
Coach: Good, OK. So, what happens if the back line, our defensive line, sags back; is not as 
high up the field? (As he speaks, the coach moves the back three cones [illustrative of the 
team’s three defenders] well back behind the chalk line creating considerable space between 
them and the rest of the team) 
Player 3: It becomes harder to close down the opposition when they have the ball, because 
the spaces on the field are bigger. 
Coach: So now can you see the value in our defensive line playing high? 
Players: yes, ok. 
Coach: Good, now…. 
Player 4: (puts his hand up) 
Coach: Yes, Nicolas? 
Player 4: I understand that, but where does this idea of ‘showing them [the opponent in 
possession] the inside’ fit with that? 
Coach: Can someone explain that to Nicolas? 
Player 1: Isn’t it to do with directing their possession to make it predictable? 
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Coach: Well, yes in a way. But it’s more than that. (Bending down again, the coach lays out 
11 red cones in the general shape used by opposing teams, in relation to and within the white 
cones). Now, as you can see, the white cones are us and the red cones are them. This is where 
their players will generally stand in relation to you. Can you see that? 
Players: Yes, yes. 
Coach: Now (pointing to a peripheral red cone), assuming that this wide player has got the 
ball, how do we need to react? 
Player 2: We need to shuffle across the field, making him pass in-field….so as to make the 
play predictable. 
Coach: yes, that’s right…but as I said, there is more to the strategy than that…any ideas?... 
No? OK, well if we force the opposition to play the ball in-field (and pointing to the set up 
cones), do we have players in that area already or not? 
Players: Yes, we do; a lot. 
Coach: So, by doing that we are forcing them to play in confined spaces which is difficult to 
do right? 
Player 3: Right…so, it’s the same principle as holding a high defensive line. 
Coach: That’s right. And remember that our more concrete strategies like holding a high line 
and forcing the opposition to play inside are not based on absolute rules but on principles. So, 
now you can see how the principle of denying opponents space to play can be realised in 
action. 
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Players: Yup…got it…ok…let’s play. 
Without pointedly ‘telling’ how this interchange fits neatly into an AT framework, no doubt 
the interaction cited can be understood through such a lens. Indeed, the purpose here was to 
‘freeze’ (as best as possible) an example of pedagogic activity in time, thus providing 
something of a window into a dynamic coaching system (Hardman, 2007). The episode was 
‘sparked’ by the coach checking athletes’ understanding. When this was not clear, the 
evaluative episode was created, with the evaluative criteria being re-stated early in the piece 
(Coach: ‘Remember, the point is here…’). This is the understanding the coach wishes to 
generate or refine, and can be interpreted as the ‘object’; something which the athletes also 
recognise. The material ‘tools’ relate to the coloured cones and chalk line (and even to the 
coach’s imaginary pushing action), which are used to illustrate the principle of denying space 
to opposition players. These tools are supplemented and supported by the coach’s talk, which 
involves both instruction and questioning in moving between abstract principles and concrete 
strategies (Hardman, 2007). Such coach-initiated talk, by connecting the abstract to the 
concrete, gives personal meaning to conceptualisation and serves to mediate or guide the 
players’ understanding and engagement with the task. However, it would be erroneous to 
suppose that each evaluative episode focuses exclusively on a single object. This is because 
‘evaluative rules’ (Bernstein, 1996) exist which transmit the criteria or frame(s) of references 
for legitimate actions and answers. For example, when a coach gives reasons why an answer, 
response or behaviour is considered good or bad, the evaluative rules become evident. In this 
respect, they can be considered the “invisible rules of engagement” (Hardman, 2007: 57), 
which are flexibly treated and manipulated by the coach in response to the object and players’ 
interventions. The evaluative episode ends when the coach shifts to focus onto the next topic 
to be covered. A crucial point to remember here, however, is that the coach’s moment of 
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action or power would not exist if the activity system of coaching had not been collectively 
constructed and understood as such. It is this apparent constructed nature of coaching which 
we now consider. 
Developing an epistemological consensus for coaching 
Taking into account the case made for AT as a position from which to view sports coaching, 
and of both the ‘objective’ and ‘subjective’ discourse associated with it, a discussion 
surrounding the development of a consensual epistemology of coaching would seem 
pertinent. This was recently called for by Jones (2012), following the claim by Abraham and 
Collins (2011) that a cull of differing perspectives should take place, with prominence being 
given to coaching’s conceptualisation as a ‘nested’ (defined as ‘embedded’) decision making 
process. As opposed to a selective cull (Abraham & Collins, 2011), we view such a 
consensus as involving an agreement into what kind of knowing do competent coaches 
engage in, how does it compare with that presented in theory (Schön, 1991), and how 
knowledge construction, use and representation are interactionally communicated in coaching 
situations. That way, researchers in the field can really begin to talk to, as opposed to past, 
each other.  
Where we also differ from the perspective put forward by Abraham and Collins 
(2011), and more recently North (2013), is the degree to which the non-linear, contested 
nature of coaching should be recognised and engaged with, and, therefore, how coaching 
should be perceived. As mentioned earlier, many have argued against a modelling approach 
for coaching (see for example, Cushion, Armour & Jones, 2006; Cushion, 2007; Cassidy, 
Jones & Potrac, 2009; Bush, Silk, Lauder & Andrews, 2013 among others). Without wishing 
to revisit old ground, the criticism of the approach (which still remains valid in relation to 
recent attempts) revolves around the contention that such implied functionality associated 
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with given levels, ages, reduced forms of ‘decision making’, time-lines and directions hides a 
much more complex and multifarious process. Indeed, such an approach in seeking linear 
clarity within a composite social system appears akin to what Flyberg, Landman and Schram 
(2012: 2) termed the futile “questing after the ghost of law-like processes”. 
However, (as has been stated many times in previous work) this is not a refutation of 
structure (see for example, Jones & Wallace, 2005, 2006) or a collapse into total relativism as 
some would have us believe. Similarly, it is not a call for coaching to take up an uncritical 
post-modern cudgel interpreted as an ‘anything goes’ individualistic attitude, where coaches 
construct reality within ‘closed self-centred’ circles’ (Engström, 2000). Those of us who 
continue to both empirically research and practice coaching itself know the activity can never 
be so contingent. Rather, the case places coaching as a complex social system which, whilst 
not being devoid of structure (no system can exist without one), recognises elements of 
contestation and disorder inherently within it. In this respect, it draws from Puddifoot’s 
(2000) critique of what counts as a ‘social process’, arguing that an increasingly intricate 
appreciation is required if a more insightful conceptualisation of a process is to be developed. 
Puddifoot’s (2000) reason here is dually-founded. Firstly, it is based on the need to better 
engage with the question of “whether evidence that one social condition is followed by 
another would always demonstrate the existence of a given social process” (p.81), and, if so, 
whether any identified linkage could even be repeated (that would provide evidence for a 
process). The second major critique centres on the generally accepted unproblematic ‘linear’ 
view of such processes, one that is quite uncritically assumed in relation to other possibilities 
(e.g., of “processes having alternating phases or cycles”) (Puddifoot, 2000: 82). Alternatively, 
a process here is considered subject to and shaped by the practice vagaries of everyday life 
comprising such actions as ‘drift’, tinkering’ and ‘improvisation’ (Smith, 2005); something 
altogether more complex (and realistic) than a direct conjunction of chronological events. 
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Such a process is also considered a social construction, in that a coach’s role and actions 
would not exist without the tacit agreement of other social actors (i.e., athletes, 
administrators, policy makers, and referees or umpires). A coach’s possibility to act (or make 
decisions) then, is dependent on his or her place within the given social activity system 
(Engström, 2000).  
This of course, is not a particularly new terrain for discussion, as the contention for 
epistemic uncertainty in many areas, and particularly pedagogy, has been a constant 
philosophic thread from Socrates onwards (Hoyle & Wallace, 2008). Perhaps the problem for 
many coaching scholars is to truly embrace this interpretive epistemology of contingency 
while being somewhat rooted in an external/realist ontology of a progressive process. That is, 
recognising the need for a forward momentum of athlete development and improvement, 
whilst appreciating that how this may be done is dependent on many contextual factors. For 
some, however, it seems easier to stay pre-set in one perceived tradition; and, in particular, on 
the conceptually untroubling ground of modelled rationality which, although easy to think 
with, bears little resemblance to actual phenomena (Flyvbjerg, 2001). However, if we accept 
that coaching is relational (that is, it occurs between people and not only in the mind of the 
individual), the positivist paradigm as a founding ontology for it, where behaviours occur 
from a sequential chain of cause and effect, can only be rejected (Garratt, 2013). This is 
because, due to the unpredictability of human relations and reactions, no ‘unimpeachable’ 
foundations related to a universalising set of practices can ever be so deduced. A principal 
reason for this refutation is that such a perspective tends to factor out context, assuming 
relational behaviours take place in a social vacuum (Scott, 2009). 
Despite differing perspectives (e.g., Garratt, in press; Bush et al, 2013; Abraham & 
Collins, 2011; North, 2013), no doubt a degree of agreement exists in and about coaching, in 
that its primary purpose is about athlete learning and performance improvement. This, we 
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would contend (as argued earlier [Jones, 2006]) cuts across any artificial simplistic 
dichotomies related to ‘performance’, ‘development’ or ‘participation’ domains. Although 
such a position suggests the existence of ‘good practice’ guidelines somewhat immune from 
the contingencies of context, the consensus here can be incorporated and addressed (without 
losing situational importance) by the interpretive paradigm. Here then, we take issue with 
North’s (2013) erroneous claim that interpretivism exists without “reference to any mediated 
reality [thus] neglecting any commonalities and consistencies evident in the social world” 
(p.283). For example, the social anthropologist Claude Lévi-Strauss (1963) described 
common cultural themes (or social understandings) as ‘structural universals’, while the 
phenomenologist Alfred Schütz (1972) termed them ‘intersubjective agreements’. Similarly, 
the sociologist Harold Garfinkel (1967) saw social life as governed by rule-following 
behaviour which gave a semblance of social order and accord. The principal difference, of 
course, between these interpretations and those from the more objective and external-
orientated paradigm is that such systems or rules are not considered independent structures 
imposed on individuals, but rather as created by people in the ‘course of their everyday lives’ 
(Scott, 2009). Garfinkel’s (1967) response to the question of why such rules are seemingly 
unquestioningly complied with was that we all have vested interests in upholding them 
because of the social order and ontological security they provide. In coaching then, we can 
interpret an exchange going on, where both coach and athletes sacrifice some power and 
control in return for the benefits gained from respecting social rules and norms. 
Such theorising, it can be argued, encompasses many paradigms (including the post-
modernist, post-positivist, critical realist and post-structuralist), and locates coaching largely 
within the interpretive realm. Although an argument could be made for coaching to somewhat 
sit within or close to the critical paradigm, the case for it as a functional, positivist, 
behaviourist activity no longer rings true. In developing this line of reasoning further, we 
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postulate that coaching can best be located within post-structuralist thinking. Despite being 
suspicious of objective conceptualisations, post- structuralists have no intention of 
abandoning general theorising altogether (Seidman & Alexander, 2001). Rather, credence is 
paid to a cultural structuralism; what Bourdieu, in allowing for the creative interplay of 
cultural rules, famously called ‘a feel for the game’. The important point to be made here is 
that an acceptance of structure exists, albeit it a sceptical one with recognition given to 
relational social power (Seidman & Alexander, 2001). Such a stance echoes that of 
Flyvbjerg’s (2001) phronetic ‘virtuoso social actor’. Although agreeing with the subjective 
premise that there is ‘no view from nowhere’, with an emphasis given to practical situational 
knowledge, phronesis or the phronetic position also proposes that decisions are taken within a 
framework of value-rationality. Such rationality, however, doesn’t equate to the confined, 
codified and tidy structures advocated by neo-positivists, but to situated judgement about 
what is good (within a culture) to do. Again, the related criteria for such judgments come 
from the moral collective climate or common view among the group or culture under study 
(Hemmestad, Jones, & Standal, 2010). For Flyvbjerg (2006, p. 375) then, “sociality and 
history is the only solid foundation we have, the only solid ground under our feet”. In this 
respect, he concluded that “there are rules and there is the particular”, thus avoiding total 
relativism as much as rule-based objectivity (2001: 49). 
Finally, in this context, Leone (2010) both critiqued and examined notions of 
improvisation in management cultures. As opposed to merely springing from agential 
flourishes, in borrowing from Vera and Rodriguez-Lopez (2007), she considered the notion 
of improvisation as emanating from structures of ‘designed chaos’. Improvisation then, was 
deemed a creative, spontaneous process, whilst also being characterized by real time and 
deliberate action. The general point being made through recourse to these various writings is 
not some ‘soggy eclecticism’ that uncritically laps up any theoretical approach, a cherry 
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picking of convenience (Foucault, 2001). Rather, the intention is to cite such thinking as a 
convergent, consensual case to demonstrate a credible epistemic way forward for coaching. 
Similar to AT’s grounding considerations which allows room for both ‘objects’ and 
‘subjects’, it is a position which takes account of structure and agency. Importantly, however, 
it does more than merely advocate an abjected place for artificial accord; a middle ground for 
the sake of it. Rather, the proposed epistemological stance is reflective of a considered 
position, of which AT (as outlined in the first half of this paper) provides a concrete example. 
Concluding thoughts 
As coaching scholars continue to struggle to better understand coaching per se, AT can 
provide an additional frame of reference towards this end. It can do so by recognising that 
coaching knowledge grows primarily from an intimate familiarity with contextualised 
settings which cannot be taught a priori (Flvybjerg et al., 2012), whilst still operating within 
shared understandings of practice. Doubtless, however, such a perspective will not strike a 
chord with all, as many, while rhetorically conceding that coaching is complex, still clamour 
for the linear functionality of a given ‘toolkit’ and an ‘effective’ practice model. 
Accepting that there may be several ways to position coaching, taking account of its 
non-linearity and (yes!) complex nature, we believe it should be positioned within the 
interpretivist paradigm, guided by a relativist ontology (incorporating concepts related to 
social consensus), and a subjective, interactive epistemology. In line with AT, the coaching 
self is thus positioned as an aspect of social and cultural arrangements, as opposed an 
autonomous self-contained individual. Unlike the claims and contestation of others, it is a 
view predominantly developed from empirical work (e.g., Jones Armour and Potrac, 2004; 
Purdy et al., 2009; Cushion & Jones, 2006; Santos, Jones & Mesquita, in press, among 
others). Far from being a contingency exclusive straight-jacket, such a framework can easily 
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house seemingly separate notions as ‘object’, ‘subject’ and ‘division of labour’ (as contained 
within AT) across coaching contexts. In this respect, it allows for the pursuit of an 
interpretive agenda whilst not denying the existence of an agreed target goal. Finally, we 
present such a view of coaching and subsequent theorising as pedagogical, in the sense of 
assisting readers for what is required of them, “to learn what can only be implied, and never 
as direct advice” (Flyvbjerg et al, 2012: 4). In this respect, we have tried to move beyond 
critiques of modelling and rationality as related to coaching, to a more practical and accurate 
version of its grounding epistemic reality. In doing so through presenting the case for AT as a 
sense making lens for sports coaching, we hope to have gone some way to addressing the 
theory-practice inconsistency often evident within the field, enabling a step forward for the 
discipline of sports coaching as a whole. 
 
Notes:  
1We present this empirical passage not as an example or illustration of broader findings,but as 
an instance of how AT can be used to make sense of such data. 
2The study from which this extract is drawn involved a broad ethnographic inquiry into the 
pedagogy of coaching. The focus then, was predominantly on the coach, and how his 
interactions (particularly in terms of humour) impacted on the context and the athletes’ 
general learning. 
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